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THE INHERENT POWER OF THE JUDICIARY
By HENRY M. DOWLINGo

Courts and lawyers are still under fire. The public's complaint against them is chronic; but in the last few years, the
attacks have become more acute. There is an increasing
outcry against the delays of the law; against the administration of the criminal law and the part attorneys have taken
therein. "Ambulance chasing" and professional advertisements come in for their share of denunciation, and the claim
is made that the bar has lost or is losing its prestige, because
of the misconduct of certain of its members.
A cursory examination of the list of articles recently
published in some of the leading magazines of the country
discloses the following, all relating to our profession:
"Guardians of Crime," American Magazine; "Law Lags Behind," Christian Century; "Cleaning the Courts," Atlantic;
"Deception According to Law," Nation; "Humpty-Dumpty
Rule in Law," Atlantic; "Bar for Sale," Nation; "Loophole
Lawyers," Saturday Evening Post; "Dollar Grabbers at the
Bar," Outlook; "Lawyers on the Loose," Forum; "Can a
Lawyer be a Gentleman?" Outlook.
Scarcely a week passes, but some newspaper launches a
broadside against the bar. Sometimes a priest or minister
goes wrong, and even a physician or educator has been known
to commit a crime, but the press makes no general attack upon
the ministry, the teaching profession or the medical fraternity
because of these specific instances. But with the bar it is
different: the public deems the legal profession, as a whole,
is besmirched by the misdeeds of a comparatively few conspicuous wrongdoers who are its unworthy members.
* Address delivered by Henry M. Dowling of the Indianapolis Bar at the
Annual Meeting of the Indiana State Bar Association September 7, 1935; first
published in the October American Bar Association Journal and reprinted here
with permission of that journal.
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Nor is this denunciation unreasonable, from the public's
viewpoint. It, correctly or incorrectly, believes the bar could
purge itself if it would, but it does not wish to do so. Furthermore, the infrequency of disbarment proceedings and
investigations of professional malpractice is noticeable; the
percentage in Indiana, for the five year period between 1929
and 1934 being 8/10 to 1,000 members of the bar; as against
10, 11 and 12 in some other states. The methods for disciplining the derelict members are cumbersome and ineffective,
and the legislatures, composed largely of lawyers, do not show
any great eagerness to right the situation; as was evidenced
by the cool reception accorded by recent general assemblies
to reform measures submitted by the Indiana State Bar
Association.
These are counts in the indictment; but the lawyer also has
his complaint against present conditions. He sees the practice
of law, in and out of courts, going more and more into the
hands of trust companies, automobile associations, protective
associations, collection associations, adjustment concerns, hospital councils, incorporated law-dispensers, and other lay
agencies, and when he raises his voice against them he is met
with the cry of "monopolist," "self-seeker," and "dog-in-themanger."
The condition in which the bar finds itself is anything but
satisfactory; and the unhappy fact is, that the bar, of itself
alone, can do little to better conditions. Its main reliance in
that direction must be upon cooperation with the courts.
There were courts centuries before there were lawyers; but
today, the bench and bar are so intimately related that the
problems of one are the problems of the other; and the courts,
aided by the bar, hold the key to the solution of those
problems.
Nor have the courts been backward in declaring their
right to help improve the situation, by supervising and disciplining the bar, and at the same time safeguarding its
traditional rights. In doing so, the bench has claimed what
it calls its inherent powers, independent of legislative grant.

The courts do not place themselves above the State or Federal
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Constitutions, but, as one of the three great departments of
government, they assert independence under those constitutions. They deny the right of legislative dominance, but they
do not deny the right and advantage of legislative cooperation
in rendering the judiciary more effective.
This claim of inherent judicial power is no novelty. In a
variety of instances, wholly dissociated from visitorial authority over the legal profession, the courts have exerted
powers never expressly bestowed upon them by constitution
or statute; powers pertaining to their own procedure,' the
2
physical surroundings and appointment of their court rooms,

the punishment for contempt of their authority, s and in many
other matters.

4

When the question relates to the inherent authority of the
courts over conduct of members of the bar, the judiciary unhesitatingly declare in favor of their inherent power,5 though
lPeople v. Callopy, 358 II. 11, 193 N. E. 634, 639; People v. Cowdrey, 196
N. E. 838 (Il1. Sup.); Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 Atl. 312, 51 A. L. R.
356 (forbidding taking of photographs in court room); Diggs v. Diggs, 196
N. E. 858, 859 (Mass.); Brandon v. Carter, 119 Mo. 572, 581, 24 S. W. 1035,
41 A. S. R. 673, 674 (control over trusts); Matter of Steinway, 159 N. Y.
250, 265 (mandamus to aid stockholder); State v. Townley, 67 Oh. St. 21, 65
N. E. 149, 93 A. S. R. 636 (oaths administered to witnesses); Ex parte Thomas
Taylor, 110 Tex. 331, 220 S. W. 74, 9 A. L. R. 963 (honoring letters rogatory);
Dallas v. Wright, 36 S. W. (2d) 973, 77 A. L. R. 709, (Tex.) (ancillary equity
powers), 7 Ruling Case Law, p. 1033; Contra, see License to Practice Law,
67 W. Va. 213, 242, 67 S. E. 597, (dissenting opinion).
2Ex parte Mayor of Birmingham, 134 Ala. 609, 33 So. 13 (preventing
disturbing noises during court sessions); Dahnke v. People, 168 11. 102, 48
N. E. 137 (court's quarters); City of New Orleans v. Bell, Sheriff, 14 La. Ann.
214 (same) ; State v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 Pac. 689 (court room equipment) ;
Commissioners v. Hall, 7 Watts (Pa.) 290 (board and lodging for jurors);
Surveyors v. Wingfield, Judge, 27 Gratt (Va.) 329, 335; Belvin v. Richmond,
85 Va. 574, 8 S. E. 378, 1 L. R. A. 807 (same) ; In re Janitor of Supreme Court,
35 Wis. 410, 418-419 (appointment of janitor); In re Court Room, 148 Wis.
109, 121 (court quarters) ; In re Lyman, 55 Fed. 29, 42 (court's quarters).
3 Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338; Hale v. State, 55 Oh. St. 210, 45 N. E. 199, 60
A. S. R. 691, 36 L. R. A. 254.
4 Schwelzel v. Board of Comrs., 16 Idaho 32, 100 Pac. 106, 133 A. S. R. 89,
21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 199; McQuigan v. R. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 50.
5 People v. Peoples Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901, 906 (lower court's
authority over bar not exclusive of Supr. Ct.) ; In re Egan, 22 S. Dak. 355, 117
N. W. 874 (legislative grounds for disbarment not exclusive); In re Burton,
246 Pac. 188 (Utah); In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 94, 126 Atd. 550 (practicing
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the legislature has not seen fit to expressly grant it,6 a typical
instance being, the permission accorded by a court to attorneys
from other states to participate in specific litigation, without
complying with the general terms for admission prescribed by
the legislature.7
Among the situations where this inherent authority over
membership of the bar has been claimed are the admission
suspension, disciplining and disbarment of attorneys; for
these, no legislative permission is considered requisite; and if
a statute exists, it is not regarded as exclusive in its pro8
visions.
While the courts thus freely use the term "inherent power,"
they do not always define it. It may signify an authority
asserted over and above, and independent of, the constitution.
If so, the claim is unwarranted. 9
Or it may mean the right of the court to act in a matter left
untouched by the legislature; but where the statute, when
enacted, will override the court; in which event, the "inherent
power" amounts to little or nothing.10
Or, again, the term may connote what is essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the court as a constitutional
without authority); In re Ole Mosness, 39 Wis. 509, 20 Amer. Rep. 55 (forbidding practice by non-resident attorney).
6 Ex parte Steckler, 179 La. 410, 419, 422; State v. Harber, 129 Mo. 271, 294,
315; 31 S. W. 889; State ex rel. v. Raynolds, 22 N. Mex. 1, 158 Pac. 413;
In re Simpson, 9 N. Dak. 379, 83 N. W. 541; Rhode Island Bar Assn. v.
Automobile Service Assn., 179 At. 139, 141 (R. I. 1935).
7 Freeling v. Tucker, 289 Pac. 85, 86 (Idaho).
8 In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 147; In re Randall, 11 Allen 472, 473, 479; Bar
Association v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 97 N. E. 751, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 116;
In re Carver, 224 Mass. 169, 172, 112 N. E. 877, 879; In re Ulmer, 268 Mass.
373, 167 N. E. 749, 755; In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N. E.
725, 727, 81 A. L. R. 1059; In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N. E. 313 (Mass.
1935) ; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 252 Mo. 369, 380, 158 S. W. 671; In re Bar
Assn., 109 N. J. L. 275, 278, 160 Ad. 809; State v. Winton, 11 Ore. 456, 50
Amer. Rep. 486, 5 Pac. 337; In re Lambuth, 18 Wash. 478, 480; State ex rel.
Circuit Court, 193 Wis. 132, 214 N. W. 396; Rubin v. State, 194 Wis. 207, 216
N. W. 513; C. M. etc. R. Co. v. Wolf, 199 Wis. 278, 289; In re Richards, 63
S. W. (2d) 672; (Contra, In re Waugh, 32 Wash. 50).
9 In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 393, 240 N. W. 441.
10 Re Applicants for License to Practice Law, 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635, 10
L. R. A. (N. S.) 288.
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tribunal and from the very fact that it is a court, 1' in which
case the power may be described either as "implied," "essential," "incidental" or "inherent;" always understanding that
it is a necessary adjunct to such courts as the constitution
12
has seen fit to create.
It is in this latter sense that we shall use the term, as such
is the meaning usually attached to it by the courts.
Acting under what they conceive to be their constitutional
rights as an independent factor in the government, and by
virtue of their "inherent power," the courts have declared
what constitutes the practice of law, although the legislature
may or may not have attempted to define it.13
In so doing, the courts hold that "law practice," though
perhaps incapable of exact and all-inclusive definition, embraces much more than the trial of cases in court; in fact, it
is recognized that a large proportion of law practice takes
place in the attorney's office and never reaches a court room
nor falls under the eye of a judge.
It is on this ground that it has been held, under the inherent
power of the courts, that the latter may forbid a corporation
11 Re Applicants for License to Practice Law, 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635,
10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 288.
12 In re Simpson, 9 N. Dak. 379, 404, 83 N. W. 541; In re Bruen, 102 Wash.
472, 475, 476, 172 Pac. 1152; In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 393, 240 N. W. 441.
13 People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 534, 209 Pac. 363;
Proper v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089; Boykin
v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796; Re Eastern Idaho Loan etc. Co., 49
Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157, 73 A. L. R. 1323; People v. Schreiber, 250 Ill. 345, 95
N. E. 189, 191; People v. People's Bank, 344 II. 462, 176 N. E. 901; People v.
Assn. of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 I1. 102, 187 N. E. 823; People ex rel. v.
Motorists' Assn., 354 I1. 595, 188 N. E. 827; Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529,
535, 34 N. E. 836, 837; In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N. E. 313 (Mass.) ;
Re George H. Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318, 73 A. L. R. 1319;
Fichette v. Taylor (Minn.), 254 N. W. 910, 94 A. L. R. 356; In re Bailey,
50 Mont. 365, 146 Pac. 1101; In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92
N. E. 15, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 55, 139 Amer. St. Rep. 839; People v. Alfani,
227 N. Y. 334, 125 N. E. 671; People v. Title Guarantee etc. Co., 227 N. Y.
366, 125 N. E. 666; Matter of Pace, 170 App. Div. 818, 156 N. Y. S. 641;
People v. Title Guarantee Co., 180 App. Div. 648, 168 N. Y. S. 278-280;
Land Title Co. v. Dworken, 129 Oh. St. 23, 193 N. E. 650; Rhode Island Bar
Assn. v. Automobile Service Assn., 179 At. 139, 141 (R. I. 1935); Re Duncan,
83 S. Car. 186, 65 S. E. 210, 211, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 750; In re Eastern Idaho
Co., 288 Pac. 157; State v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 74 S. W. (2d) 348.
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to "practice law," although the offender does not appear in
court proceedings ;14 for the reason that, in the nature of the
case, a corporation cannot comply with the moral and intellectual qualifications exacted of individual members of the bar, 15
and when it acts for a patron through its attorney, the latter
is under a divided allegiance to the client and to the corporation which pays him;"' or the corporation itself may have a
selfish interest to subserve, not consistent with its undivided
17
duty toward the client.
The court, in condemning practice of law by corporations,
acts not only for the protection of clients but in aid of worthy
members of its own bar who would otherwise be compelled to
compete with these illicit lay organizations.' 8
Claiming to act under their implied authority, the courts
have granted injunctions against the unauthorized corporations, 19 and have disciplined attorneys who, by their professional activity, aid the corporation in the practice of law.20
The scope of the inherent power of the courts as claimed
by them, is seen in their frequently asserted right to investigate and control the conduct and practices of individual
14People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 538, 209 Pac. 363;
People v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089; State
v. Credit Men's Assn., 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S. W. (2d) 918; State v. Merchants'
Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 17, 177 Pac. 694, 696; 2 Ruling Case Law,
p. 946.
15 Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796; N. Y. Photo Co. v.
Schonert and Sons, 95 N. J. Eq. 12; Black and White Operating Co. v. Grosbart,
107 N. J. L. 63, 68, 168 At. 229, 231; Unger v. Landlords' Management Corp.,
114 N. J. Eq. 68, 72, 168 AtI. 229, 231.
16 People v. People's Trust Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 497, 167 N. Y. S. 767.
17 People v. Title Guarantee etc. Co., 180 App. Div. 648, 650, 653, 168
N. Y. S. 278, 280; State v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 74 S. W. (2d) 348, 359.
'SPeople v. People's Bank, 344 I1. 462, 176 N. E. 901, 906; Land Title
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Oh. St. 23, 193 N. E. 650.
19 Land Abstract Co. v. Dworken, 129 Oh. St. 23, 193 N. E. 650; and see
Fichette v. Taylor, (Minn.) 254 N. W. 910, 94 A. L. R. 356.
20 People v. Macauley, 230 Ill. 208, 120 Amer. St. Rep. 287, 82 N. E. 612;
Midland Co. v. Donnelley, 219 I1. App. 271, 277; Re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254,
232 N. W. 318, 73 A. L. R. 1319; Matter of Rothschild, 140 App. Div. 583,
125 N. Y. S. 629; Matter of Pace, 170 App. Div. 818, 824, 156 N. Y. S. 641;
Rhode Island Bar Assn. v. Automobile Service Assn., 179 AtI. 139, 146, (R. I.
1935); In re Gill, 104 Wash. 160, 176 Pac. 11; and see Re Morse, 98 Vt. 85,
126 At]. 550, 36 A. L. R. 527.
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members of the bar; on the ground that admission does not
close the door to inquiry as to whether the fair moral and
professional character which once existed still continues. 21
In fact, this essential authority is said to extend to disbarment for wrongful acts having no direct reference to the
practice of law, provided they indicate such a lack of integrity
and moral character or disregard for the laws of the land, as
unfit the attorney for the discharge of his professional
duties.

22

In recent years, the courts have pressed their inherent
power much further, and instead of limiting their inquiries to
the conduct of certain individuals, have inaugurated sweeping
investigations of the bar collectively, without reference to
named persons; for the purpose of ascertaining if objectionable practices are being indulged in, which should be corrected.
Thus, inquiries as to the prevalence of "ambulance chasing"
in a given jurisdiction have been ordered by the courts, and
the right of the investigators to compel witnesses to give in23
formation under oath has been upheld.

It thus appears that, whether rightfully or wrongfully, the
courts have claimed an inherent judicial power of wide and
expanding extent. A pertinent inquiry arises, whether such
claim can be sustained on reason, or is it an unwarranted
arrogation of authority by the judiciary?
21 Selling v. Radford, 243 U. S. 46, 61 L. Ed. 585; In re Ulmer, 268 Mass.
273, 167 N. E. 749, 753; In re H-, 87 N. Y. 521.
22People v. Meyerovitz, 278 Ill. 356, 116 N. E. 189; People v. Jadrich,
320 Ill. 344, 151 N. E. 241; People v. People's Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901;
Underwood v. Commonwealth, 105 S. W. 151 (semble) (Ky.); Boston Bar
Assn. v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 183, 46 N. E. 568; In re Carver, 224 Mass.
169, 172, 112 N. E. 877, 879; In re Mills, -1 Mich. 392; In re Richards, 63 S. W.
an attorney, 86 N. Y. 563; In re Platz,
(2d) 672, (Mo.) ; In the matter of -,
42 Utah 439, 132 Pac. 390; In re Burton, 246 Pac. 188 (Utah); State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250, 10 S. E. 407; License to Practice Law, 67 W. Va.
213, 67 S. E. 597; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265. (But see In re Dampier, 46
Idaho 195, 267 Pac. 452.)
23 In re Bar Assn. Hudson County, 109 N. J. L. 275, 160 Atl. 809; People
v. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487, 60 A. L. R. 856; Matter of Bar Assn.
of New York, 222 App. Div. 580, 584, 587, 227 N. Y. S. 1; Matter of Brooklyn
Bar Assn., 223 App. Div. 149, 227 N. Y. S. 666; Rubin v. State, 194 Wis.
207, 214.
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Before answering that question, it were well to examine
certain fundamental principles bearing on the subject. The
first of these is, that the right to be admitted to the practice

of law (as distinguished from the right to practice after
admission) is not an absolute natural, property right, uncon-

trollable by courts or legislatures, but is a mere privilege,
subject to reasonable restrictions.24
When the applicant is admitted, it is by adjudication indicating that he is possessed of the necessary legal qualifications.

Such adjudication can be nothing less than a judicial act.25
Similarly, when he is suspended or disbarred, it is by judi-

26
cial action; i. e., a judgment of a court.

In disbarring, suspending or disciplining an attorney, the
court does not presume to invade the province of the legisla-

ture by fixing a penalty for wrongdoing, nor to duplicate the
punishment meted out by the criminal law; for such judicial
action is not punitive but protective; to safeguard the court,

the bar, and the public against misconduct by the wrongdoer. 27
24 O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 56, 55, 63 At. 777; In re Durant, 80
Conn. 140, 147; In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 693, 266 Pac. 665; Unger v.
Landlord's Management Corp., 114 N. J. Eq. 68, 69, 168 At!. 229; Danforth v.
Egan, 23 S. Dak. 43, 119 N. W. 1021, 139 Amer. St. Rep. 1030; License to
Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 223, 67 S.E. 597; In re Scott, 292 Pac. 291, 295.
25 Brydonjack v. State Bar (Cal.), 281 Pac. 1018, 66 A. L. R. 1507; People v.
People's Bank, 344 11. 462, 176 N. E. 901; Hanson v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 843,
115 Pac. 646, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240; In re application of Henry W. Cooper,
22 N. Y. 67; License to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 218, 67 S. E. 597; Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall (U. S.) 333; 6 Corpus Juris, p. 571.
26 In re Shattruck, 208 Cal. 6, 279 Pac. 998; Brodenjack v. State Bar Assn.,
208 Cal. 439, 281 Pac. 1018; Carpenter v. State of California, 211 Cal. 358,
295 Pac. 23; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 147; In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676,
687, 266 Pac. 665; In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 653; Hanson v. Grattan,
84 Kan. 843, 115 Pac. 646, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240; In re Royal], 33 New Mex.
386; Petition of Splane, 123 Pa. St. 527, 540; In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472,
172 Pac. 1151; License to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 218, 67 S. E. 597;
Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523.
27
1n re Randall, 11 Allen 473, 480; In re Richards, 63 S. W. (2d) 672, 679
(Mo.); In re Bar Assn. Hudson County, 109 N. J. L. 275, 278, 160 At]. 809;
In re Randall, 158 N. Y. 216, 52 N. E. 1106; In re Rouss, 221 N. Y. 84, 116
N. E. 783; State ex rel. v. Winton, 11 Oreg. 456, 465, 50 Amer. Rep. 486,
5 Pac. 337; Rhode Island Bar Assn. v. Automobile Service Assn., 179 AtI. 139,
141; In re Platz, 42 Utah 439, 443, 444, 132 Pac. 390; Ex parte Wall, 107
U. S. 265.
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The disciplinary actions of the courts being judicial and
not legislative, must have a source other than the General
Assembly; for the latter cannot, under our three-fold form of
government, grant something it does not possess. Since each
branch of the government is substantially independent of the
others in its primary and essential functions, the only adequate
source for the authority of the courts over the members of
the bar must be the people, speaking by their constitution,
which vests all judicial power in the courts.
But while this is true, and would seem to prevent the
legislature from enacting any laws relating to admissions or
disbarments of attorneys, it has long been recognized that the
legislature, in the exercise of its police power for the public
welfare, should have something to say about qualifications for
the bar, as it legislates concerning qualifications of physicians,
dentists, and members of other professions made subject to
legislative license. The courts have conceded that the legislature may rightfully declare certain classes of applicants
ineligible to the bar, because of their lack of moral or intellectual qualifications; the basis for such prohibition being the
interest of the public in an upright and efficient body of
28
practitioners.
It is said that such restrictions are not limitations on the
powers of the judiciary but restrictions laid upon the indi29
viduals who apply for admission.

But while the legislature may thus fix the minimum requirements, and forbid the admission of those lacking such, it cannot determine the maximum qualifications and require the
28 In re Chapelle, 71 Cal. App. 129, 234 Pac. 906; Brydonjack v. State Bar,
281 Pac. 1018, 66 A. L. R. 1507 (Cal., 1929); In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E.
646, 649; Robinson's Case, 131 Mass. 376, 41 Amer. Rep. 239; Danforth v. Egan,
23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021, 139 Amer. St. Rep. 1030; Motion to admit Miss
Goodell, 39 Wis. 240, 20 Amer. Rep. 42; Vernon County Bar Assn. v. McKibbin, 153 Wis. 350, 141 N. W. 283; In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 381, 382,
240 N. W. 441; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Keeley v. Evans, 271 Fed.
520, 524.
29 In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N. E. 725, 727, 81
A. L. R. 1059; In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 381, 382, 240 N. W. 441.
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acceptance of those who possess them;8° nor can it limit the
grounds for disbarment nor interfere therewith. 3 1
Nor restore an attorney who has been dismissed from-his
32
profession by judgment of a court.
The courts further recognize that the lawmakers may prescribe rules in aid of the courts, concerning admission or disbarment, but that the inherent judicial power may not be
impinged upon by such regulations. A court may ignore them,
if it deems them unreasonable. 33
It is upon this theory of legislative aid that State Bar Acts
("Integrated Bar" statutes) have been upheld,3 4 as well as
legislative grounds for disbarment;35 and the designation by
30 In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 412413, 416, 248 Pac. 29; Brodenjack v. State
Bar, 281 Pac. 1018, 66 A. L. R. 1507 (Cal., 1929); In re Branch, 41 Vroom
(N. J.) 537, 574, 575, 57 At. 431, 437; In re Charles L. Thacher, 12 Ohio
N. P. (N. S.) 273; Olmstead's Case, 292 Pa. 96, 103, 104, 140 Atd. 634; License
to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 218, 222, 67 S. E. 597; In re Boyd Adkins,
83 W. Va. 673; In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509; Vernon County Bar Assn. v. McKiblin, 153 Wis. 350, 354, 141 N. W. 283; In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 381,
240 N. W. 441; In re Shorter, Fed. Cas. No. 12811; 3 Amer. and Eng. Ency.
Law, p. 287.
31 6 Corpus Juris, 580, 581; In re Richards, 63 S. W. (2d) 672, 679 (Mo.);
State Bar Com. v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 703, L. R. A. 1915D, 1218,
1223, 1228; but see, In re Saddler, 35 Okla. 510, 130 Pac. 906, 44 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 1195.
32 State ex rel. Brough, 15 Ohio C. Ct. (N. S.) 97, 33 Ohio C. C. 257,
90 Ohio St. 382, 108 N. E. 1133.
33 In re Chapelle, 234 Pac. 906, 71 Cal. App. 129; In re Day, 181 Ill. 73,
54 N. E. 646, 651, 652; Witter v. Cook County Comrs., 256 Ill. 616, 100 N. E.
148; People v. Callopy, 358 Il1. 11, 192 N. E. 634; In re Opinion of the Justices,
194 N. E. 313; In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N. E. 725,
728, 81 A. L. R. 1059; In re Mills, 1 Mich. 392, 394; In re Bar Assn., Hudson
County, 109 N. J. L. 275, 280, 160 Atl. 809; Petition of Splane, 123 Pa. 527, 540,
16 At. 481; In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 475, 476, 172 Pac. 1152; License to
Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 218, 222, 67 S. E. 597; Motion to Admit Miss
Goodell, 39 Wis. 240, 20 Amer. Rep. 42; Vernon County Bar Assn. v. McKiblin,
153 Wis. 350, 354, 141 N. W. 283; (Contra, see In re Application of Cooper,
22 N. Y. 67; and see State v. Raynolds, 158 Pac. 413, 414, semble, distinguishing
right to admit and to disbar).
34 State Bar of California v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 323, 278 Pac. 432;
In re Shattuck, 208 Cal. 6, 279 Pac. 998; Barton v. State Bar of California,
289 Pac. 818, 819 (Cal.); In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 690, 266 Pac. 665; In
re Henry, 46 Idaho 578, 269 Pac. 416; In re Scott, 292 Pac. 291, 296 (Nevada).
35 Danforth v. Egan, 23 S. Dak. 43, 119 N. W. 1021, 139 Amer. St. Rep. 1030.
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the legislature of particular courts having authority to admit
to, or disbar from, practice, and the effect of such admission.a 6
We have thus far seen that the courts claim large inherent
authority, independent of the legislature, especially in relation
to controlling the members of the bar; and that they have
held the legislature to be restricted, for the most part, to
rendering aid to the courts in matters pertaining to admissions and disbarments. We shall now proceed to inquire,
whether this claim of inherency on the part of the courts is
predicated on solid foundations.
The historical approach to the question is unsatisfactory.
Against the possession of this regulatory power over the bar,
strong arguments have been made, based on the legislative
control exercised over the legal profession in England in
remote and modern times. But while, in support of this view,
many Acts of Parliament governing the bar can be cited, as
well as orders of the King, it must be remembered that in
England, parliament is practically supreme. It may depose
and decapitate a king, and has done so. It may abolish and
create courts, and has done so. The nearest approach to
parliament in the United States is a constitutional convention,
and not a state or national legislature. No valid argument
against the inherent power of American courts with respect to
the bar can rest upon historic examples drawn from English
legal history and parliamentary action.
But even in England, from ancient times, the authority of
courts to admit, disbar and discipline members of the bar has
been recognized.37 And barristers, while not strictly under
the direct disciplinary power of the courts, were members of
the Inns of Court which in turn were subject to strict visitation
by the judges. 38
36 In re Mock, 146 Cal. 378, 80 Pac. 64-; Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor,
60 Conn. 11, 22 At. 441; Hoopes v. Bradshaw, 231 Pa. 485, 80 AtI. 1098.
37 3 Blackstone's Com., p. 26; In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 649;
State v. Reynolds, 252 Mo. 369, 405, 406, 158 S. W. 67 (Woodson, J., dissenting
opinion); Rhode Island Bar Assn. v. Automobile Service Assn., 179 Atl. 139,
143; People ex rel. v. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487, 60 A. L. R. 851, 856.
38 People ex rel. v. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487, 60 A. L. R. 851, 856.
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But in the United States the doctrine has been announced
and reiterated almost without dissent, that the members of
the bar are officers of the court; amenable to it as their
superior. Not that they are agents or representatives in the
ordinary sense of being able to bind the courts by their actions; but they sustain that dose, intimate relationship to
the bench which can best be expressed by the phrase, "officer
of the court."3 9

Being such appointees, the court has an immediate interest
in the character of the bar, for the court's own sake. A good
bar is a necessity for a good bench; and the labors of the
latter are lightened and rendered more effective by the learning and ability of the bar,40 exactly as they are facilitated by
efficient receivers, commissioners, referees, masters in chancery, bailiffs or probation officers; all of whom are subject
4x
to removal by the court.
Furthermore, the lawyer is frequently the first judge to pass
upon a case. This he does in the privacy of his office, before
the stage of litigation is reached. He interprets laws, before
and after litigation; and the skill and ability with which he
interprets them, means much to the courts before whom they
ultimately come.
But aside from the mere intellectual aid to be rendered the
court by a competent bar, there is the inherent right of the
court to surround itself with honest assistants who are sympathetic and will unite with it in the proper administration of
justice and in maintaining that administration on a high plane.
That is the main business of the court; and whatever obstructs
or embarrasses its chief function, must be under its control;
it cannot practically reside anywhere else.
39 3 Amer. and Eng. Ency. Law, p. 287; Carpenter v. State of California,
73,
211 Cal. 358, 295 Pac. 23; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140; In re Day, 181 Ill.
462, 176 N. E. 901; Ex parte
54 N. E. 646, 647; People v. People's Bank, 344 Ill.
Steckler, 179 La. 410, 422; Bar Assn. v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 192, 97 N. E.
751; In re Application of Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67; People v. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465,
162 N. E. 487, 60 A. L. R. 856; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333.
40 Fairchild County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 17, 22 At. 441; License to
Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 218, 67 S. E. 597.
41 Witter v. Cook County Comrs., 250 Ill. 616, 100 N. E. 148.
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Hence the authority of a court over those who have a
personal, monetary investment in a litigated cause, liable to
42
weigh more heavily with them than their regard for justice.
Again: the usefulness of courts depends largely upon their
maintaining the dignity which should attach to them. To the
preservation or destruction of that dignity, the bar can substantially contribute. The court is regularly engaged in
administering correct principles of justice and of fair dealing
among men. If members of the bar, in their professional
conduct, belie those principles, the dignity of the court is
43
bound to suffer.
Therefore the court has the right to discipline the unworthy
member, and to exclude those who, in contempt of the tribunal,
seek to practice law before it without proper admission, or
44
otherwise disparage the court's dignity.
The court is likewise interested, for its own sake, in purging
its calendars of champertous causes or those not instituted in
good faith; for these unnecessarily clog its legitimate business, 45 add to the expense of maintaining the court, and render
judges and juries mere cat's-paws for those who seek extortion
and injustice. Such suits may lead to retaliatory and irregular
measures by their opponents, thus involving the court46 in an
unseemly contest, with wrongdoing active on each side.
Finally, the court may suffer unjust criticism for delays in
litigation due to the procrastination or dilatory tactics of
attorneys. The judges are interested, therefore, in protect42 Rubin v. State, 194- Wis. 207, 214; C. M., etc., R. Co. v. Wolf, 199 Wis.
278, 289; In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 383, 240 N. W. 441.
43 Re Brooklyn Bar Assn., 223 App. Div. 149, 227 N. Y. S. 666; State v.
Hayes, 64 W. Va. 45, 52, 61 S. E. 355.
44 Re Eastern Idaho Loan, etc., Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157, 73 A. L. R.
1323; People v. Macauley, 230 Ill. 208, 120 Amer. St. Rep. 287, 82 N. E. 612;
People v. Assn. of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Il1. 102, 187 N. E. 823; People v.
Motorists' Assn., 354 Ill. 595, 188 N. E. 827; Creditors' Clearing House v.
Bannwart, 227 Mass. 579, 116 N. E. 886, Amer. Cas. 1918C 136; Re George H.
Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318, 73 A. L. R. 1319; In re Cooperative
Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15, 32 L. R A. (N. S.) 55, 139 Amer. St. Rep.
839; Land Title Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N. E. 650.
45 Rubin v. State, 194 Wis. 207, 214.
46 Rhode Island Bar Assn. v. Automobile Service Assn., 179 Atl. 139, 146.
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ing themselves, by proper discipline, from incurring the unfair
47
complaints of the public.
In addition to these duties which the court owes to itself
and which it can discharge by appealing to its inherent powers,
it is under obligation to the upright members of its bar, to
protect them from the wrongful practitioner, and the odium
48
the latter may cast upon the entire profession.
A third class of duties owing by the courts is to the state
and to the public, any member of which is potentially a litigant or may need the services of an attorney. Because of the
close connection between the bench and bar as constituting
parts of one judicial system, the control to which the bar can
be and has been subject, at the hands of the court, and the
fact that courts possess part of the sovereignty of the state
which has been vested in them by the constitution, the public
has a right to assume that the practice of law is affected with
a public interest and that the courts will perform their duty
as depositories of a portion of the state's sovereignty, and
not permit dishonest or incompetent attorneys to prey upon
or misguide their fellow citizens, 49 leaving the client with
only a dubious claim for malpractice against the attorney, in
a suit wherein private interests might be embarrassingly
divulged.
Furthermore, the bar is a moulder of public opinion, having
a profound effect upon government, for good or ill. It constitutes the body from which judges, and many legislators, are
chosen. These facts make it a public institution, and one
which can best be regulated by the courts, whose code of rules
reduces to certainty those professional standards which would
otherwise be vague, and whose desciplinary machinery is, or
can be made, adequate for effective control of the bar.
47 In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 384, 240 N. W. 441.
48 People v. People's Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 900, 906; Re Bar Association, 222 App. Div. 580, 227 N. Y. S. 1; Land Title Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193 N. E. 650; In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 Ad. 550, 36 A. L. R. 527;
Barton v. State Bar, 289 Pac. 818, 820.
49 State Bar of California v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 323, 331, 278 Pac. 432;
In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.)

55, 139 Amer. St. Rep 839; Rhode Island Bar Assn v. Automobile Service
Assn., 179 Ad. 139, 143 (R. I., 1935).
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In view, therefore, of the vital interests which the courts
have in the bar, from the standpoint of the courts themselves,
the membership and the general public, there is no reason to
doubt the right of the judiciary to take all reasonable and
appropriate steps to afford these protections and discharge
these obligations.
Just what those measures shall be, must be determined
largely by the courts themselves. Knowing the situation needing a remedy, they are in the best position to select one. They
need not sit passively and await action by some one else; but
may select their own agency for action. 50
Hence, they may use contempt proceedings, against those
who show disrespect for the court or who practice law without authority or aid another in so doing; or an injunction;O
or inaugurate inquiries into the acts of individuals, or general
investigations of irregular practices; or utilize the organizations provided by State Bar Acts. While not capable of creating a State Bar Corporation, much the same results might be
reached through the selection by the Supreme Court of general and local committees, charged with the duty of investigating and making recommendations as to admission, disciplining
and disbarment.
We have thus far considered the subject as reflected in the
decisions and declarations of courts throughout the United
States. The rulings of the higher courts of Indiana are, for
the most part, in entire accord with what has been already
stated. Inherent power in the judiciary is sustained in this
state by a long line of decisions, involving a variety of judicial
actions;51 including, among others, the right to punish for
5ORosenthal v. State Bar, 165 Ad. 211, 213, 214 (Conn.); In re Randall,
11 Allen 473, 479; Matter of Bar Assn. of City of New York, 222 App. Div.
580, 586, 227 N. Y. S. 1; State v. Hays, 64 W. Va. 45, 48, 61 S. E. 355; Vernon
County Bar Assn. v. McKiblin, 153 Wis. 350, 353, 141 N. W. 283; Rubin v.
State, 216 N. W. 513, 516; McVicar v. State Board, 6 Fed. (2d) 33, 35.
50a Fichette v. Taylor (Minn.), 254 N. W. 910, 94 A. L. R. 356.
51 Brown v. Brown, 4 Ind. 627 (taxing costs to attorney); Nealis, Admr. v.
Dicks, 72 Ind. 374 (setting aside judgment for fraud); Sanders v. State, 85
Ind. 318, 329 (issuing writ coram nolis) (relieving from excusable mistakes,
etc.); Gregory v. State, 94 Ind. 384 (fixing bail); Smythe v. Boswell, 117 Ind.
365, 366 (semble) (extending time for appeal) ; State ex rel. v. Noble, 118
Ind. 350, 359, 360 (selection of assistants) ; Hutts v. Martin, 131 Ind. 1, 3
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contempt, 5 2 to prescribe rules for court procedure,53 and to
take such action as is reasonably necessary to enable them to
perform their judicial functions fully and freely and preserve
their dignity, decorum and order. 54
Our courts hold that none of these inherent powers is
derived from the legislature, for the latter has no judicial
power to bestow, and cannot lawfully invade the territory
assigned by the constitution to the courts. 5
The powers are wholly derived from the constitution and
the common law,56 and the legislature may only aid in their
exercise; not interfere therewithY
When applied to the bar, the inherent powers of the
judiciary, as the Indiana courts declare, extend to punishing
an attorney for contempt 8 and to his admission and disbarment;39 these conclusions being based upon the fact that the
attorney is an officer of the court and hence is subject to its
control.6 0
(relieving from excusable mistakes, etc.); Bank of Westfield v. Inman, 133
Ind. 287 (relieving from excusable mistakes, etc.); Board of Comrs. v. Stout,
136 Ind. 53 (ordering operation of Court House elevator); In re McDonald,
200 Ind. 424, 164 N. E. 261 (vacating judgment procured by fraud).
52 Ex parte Smith, 2S Ind. 47, 48; Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338 (contempt
proceedings).
53 Smith v. Hamill, 137 Ind. 198, 199, 140 Ind. 340, 341; State v. Van Cleave,
157 Ind. 608; Parkinson v. Thompson, 164 Ind. 609, 626; Epstein v. State,
190 Ind. 693, 128 N. E. 353; Roberts v. Donahue, 191 Ind. 95, 131 N. E. 33, 35.
54 Board v. Thompson, 7 Ind. 265 (semble) (physical conditions); Nash,
Auditor, v. State, 33 Ind. 78 (physical conditions); Board of Comrs. v. Stout,
136 Ind. 53, 59, 60, 62 (physical conditions); Board v. Guin, Sheriff, 136 Ind.
562, 579 (physical conditions).
55 Young v. State Bank, 4 Ind. 301, 303; Deutschman v. Charleston, 40 Ind.
449; C. C. & I. R. Co. v. Board, 65 Ind. 427, 439; Shoultz v. McPheeters, 79
Ind. 373, 375; Ex parte Griffiths, Reporter, 118 Ind. 83; State ex rel. v. Noble,
118 Ind. 350, 356, 357, 360, 361, 366.
56 State ex rel. v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 354, 366.
57 Brown v. Brown, 4 Ind. 627; Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338; Holman v.
State, 105 Ind. 513, 515; Cheadle v. State, 110 Ind. 301, 309; Hawkins v. State,
125 Ind. 570, 573; State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 623, 157 N. E. 769, 774.
58 Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47, 48.
59 Walls v. Palmer, 64 Ind. 493, 495; Garrigus v. State, 93 Ind. 239, 242;
In re Petition of Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 671.
60 Ex parte Trippe, 66 Ind. 531, 535; Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Muncie Co.,
166 Ind. 466, 77 N. E. 941; Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Wuest, 40 Ind. App. 693, 82
N. E. 986.
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The legislature is conceded to have a right to declare
certain classes of persons ineligible to admission, because of
moral deficiencies," 1 and to prescribe regulations for disquali62
fying members of the bar.
The right to be admitted to practice was at one time held
in this state to be inalienable and protected by the Federal
Constitution,0 8 but the later utterance of the Supreme Court
makes it a mere privilege and not an unqualified natural or
64
constitutional right.
Since the Supreme Court has held that the constitutional
qualifications for admission to the bar have been repealed at
the election of 1932, 6 5 there is nothing to prevent the
Supreme Court from now exercising its full inherent authority
over the bar, both as to admission, discipline and expulsion.
Even those who deny such inherent power, and trace all
control of the bar back to the legislature, should be satisfied
with the purported delegation of authority by the General
Assembly to the Supreme Court, by the Act of 1931. (Burns'
Stat. 1933, Section 4-3605), so far as admissions are concerned. That statute is probably nothing more than declaratory of the inherent powers of the court; which powers extend
to disbarment and discipline, even without the aid of a
statute.
Our conclusion, therefore, is, that throughout the United
States, and specifically in Indiana, broad, inherent judicial
authority is found to exist, ample for the betterment and
control of the bar. But the views so declared have not been
accepted without criticism. These will now be briefly considered, and replied to.
It is said that all governmental power not granted by the
constitution to the executive or to the judiciary; nor reserved
61 Blake's Case, 1 Blackf. 483 (duelling); In re Petition of Leach, 134 Ind.
665, 667.
62 Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47; Klingensmith v. Kepler, 41 Ind. 341, 344;
Walls v. Palmer, 64 Ind. 493, 495; In re Petition of Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 671.
63 In re Petition of Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 669.
04 In re McDonald, 200 Ind. 424, 164 N. E. 261, 262.
65 In re Todd, 193 N. E. 865 (Ind., 1935).
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to the people, is vested in the legislature; and since no regulatory authority has been expressly granted by the constitution to the courts, it must now reside in the legislature, rewhere it was, prior to the adoption of the congardless of
stitution.115"
Otherwise expressed, the state constitution is an instrument
of grant as to the judiciary, but an instrument of limitation
as to the legislature, which latter department of government
is unrestrained in its control of the bar. But no such distinction between "judicial grant" and "legislative limitation"
appears in the Indiana constitution, which, in similar language,
vests legislative power in the General Assembly and judicial
power in the courts. This grant to the courts carries with
it those necessary, incidental powers which must belong to
them if they are to function as courts. It can, therefore,
truthfully be said that the inherent judicial powers are derived
from the constitution, which created courts to which they
were necessarily incident. 66
Furthermore, it is settled beyond dispute that the legislative department of government in the United States has
many inherent, auxiliary powers not specified in the constitution. 6 7
If the legislature has such, by the same token the judiciary
may possess them.
It is further suggested that courts should have no implied
authority over conduct of attorneys outside the court room;
and particularly with reference to non-professional activities.
But the overwhelming opinion of the courts has been that
the most flagrant wrongdoing or the display of the greatest
ignorance is most likely to occur in the attorney's or client's
office or home, and not under the eye of the court; that the
practice of law consists of much more than participation in
litigation in court. It is not the time nor place of the objectional conduct that is so important, as that it reveals a char65a State v. Reynolds, 252 Mo. 369, 158 S. W. 671 (Brown, J.).
66 State ex rel. v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 354, 356.
67 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 71 L. Ed. 580, 50 A. L. R. 1.
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acter unworthy to be accredited as a member of the bar or
e8
trusted by the public.

It is said that the legislature, not the courts, should prescribe the rules for admission to the bar, by analogy to the
licensing of physicians, dentists, plumbers, barbers and
"beauticians."69
But no such analogy exists. Those professions and occupations have nothing to do with the general system of the
administration of justice, nor do they put the judicial machinery in motion. The courts do not come into intimate contact
with them. They have no influence upon the court and afford
70
it no aid in performing its functions.
It is argued that the legislature has an almost unlimited
"police power" under which it can regulate admissions to or
expulsions from the bar; and that no inherent regulatory
power of the courts is necessary; that if the courts have such
power, the regulatory acts of the legislature are unconstitutional. However, it is generally recognized that the legislature may exert its police power in aid of the courts in their
dealings with the bar, but that such exercise must not encroach
upon the judicial functions. Thus both the police power and
the inherent power of the courts are harmonized.
It is denied that lawyers are officers of the court, and hence
are not under its visitorial power. But it is too late in the
day to deny the official relation between attorneys and the
court. They are admitted by a court adjudication and disbarred by court action. They are subject to call as special
judges or as counsel for receivers and court appointees. They
may be called upon for services as amici curiae; and in an
especial sense are assistants of the court.
It is claimed that the primary duty of the attorney is to
his client and not to the court; that the client is entitled to
have whatever representative he pleases, free from court
interference. But the premise is false. The attorney owes
88 People v. People's Bank, 344 II. 462, 176 N. E. 901; People v. Alfani,
227 N. Y. 334, 125 N. E. 671, 673.
69 Re Application for License to Practice Law, 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635,
10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 288.
70 In re Day, 181 II. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 653.
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his first duty to the court. He assumed his obligations toward it before he ever bad or could have a client. His oath
compels him to be absolutely honest with the tribunal before
which he practices, even tbuugh his client's interests may seem
to require a contrary course. The lawyers cannot serve two
masters; and the one he has undertaken to serve primarily,
is the court.
It is said that progress in the intellectual and moral requirements of the profession is more likely to result from
legislative control of the bar, than if the courts control it.
But it is not true that the courts are ultra-conservative regarding requirements for the bar. The recent acts of the courts
in using their inherent authority for improving aid purging
the profession is proof that progress may be expected from
the judiciary even more than from the legislature, which, in
most states, has shown little interest in bettering conditions.
The assertion is made that the courts should have no more
inherent power over the bar than they possess over clerks of
court; who cannot be tried summarily and dismissed by the
court for misconduct in office. 71
But the clerk is usually selected by the people, and owes
no special obligation to the court. The attorney is admitted
by the court, and sustains a relation of peculiar intimacy to
the tribunal which gave him his professional life; whose standing and reputation in the community are largely in his hands.
Finally it is argued that dire results may flow from conceding inherent judicial power. Courts, it is feared, may raise
the standards for admission to the bar so high, as to prevent
72
all but a few from practicing law.

The abuse of their power, it is suggested, may damage
t1leir own reputation in the public mind and thereby impair
their usefulness.
Regulations by the legislature, conceded to be proper if
reasonable and in aid of the courts, may conflict with regulations by the bench, so opponents of inherent power assert.
71 State v. Reynolds, 252 Mo. 369, 389, 158 S. W. 671 (Brown, J.).
72 License to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 24-3, 67 S. E. 597 (dissenting
opinion).
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It is said that if courts have this regulatory power, they may
delegate it to committees and other representatives whose
actions might be unreasonable and oppressive, and whose investigations might ruin an innocent man. We are told that
the legislature and executive branches of government might,
in the exercise of a similarly claimed "inherent power," set
up professional standards of efficiency of lawyers appearing
before committees or boards, inconsistent with the standards
set by the courts.
But these prognostications are based on unsubstantial fears
and unfounded assumptions. The inherent power of the
courts, though admitted to the fullest extent, is not omnipotent. There are recognized limits beyond which it cannot go.
There is the conceded right of the legislature to exert its
police power in prescribing reasonable rules and regulations
both as to admissions to the bar, and exclusions therefrom.
These will be followed by the courts as advisory regulations,
if deemed reasonable and not as invading the judicial
73
functions.
In disbarment or suspension proceedings, the accused attorney must have his day in court; for his right to practice, when
once duly granted, is property or a franchise which may not
be taken from him nor seriously interfered with, without due
process of law; for in this the constitutions of the state and
nation protect him ;74 and the same right has even been
extended to those who are only applicants for admission, and
not practicing lawyers. 75
Nor can the courts delegate their final authority over members of the bar, to boards of commissioners with power to act.
These agencies may be utilized for investigation or fact-finding purposes, and to make recommendations; much as a jury
73 In re Bar Assn. Hudson County, 109 N. J. L. 275, 280, 160 Atl. 809.
74 In re Peterson, 208 Cal. 42, 280 Pac. 124; and see Re Collins, 188 Cal. 701,
206 Pac. 990, 32 A. L. R. 1062; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 148; Ex parte
Smith, 28 Ind. 47; Heffren v. Jayne, 39 Ind. 463, 468; Ex parte Trippe, 66

Ind. 531, 535; State v. Reynolds, 158 Pac. 413, 417 (N. Mex.) ; State v. MeClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250, 10 S. E. 407; Kelley v. Evans, 271 Fed. 520, 522.
75 Re Application of Jesse Crum, 103 Oreg. 296, 301, 204 Pac. 948.
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may be used in an equity cause, as advisors to the court; but
the final decision must rest with the latter. 76
Nor can the judicial power become so arbitrary and oppressive as to compel an attorney, investigated by the court's
77
agencies, to incriminate himself by his answers under oath,
or divulge confidential communications made to him by his
client. The ordinary rules of evidence would operate for his
78
protection and for that of his employer.
Summing up what has been said .- the present situation of
the legal profession is unsatisfactory, both from the standpoint of the public and of the worthy practitioner, himself.
The bar alone is not in a position to correct that situation, but
in co-operation with the courts, in the exercise of their inherent judicial power, much betterment could be accomplished.
This has been demonstrated by the instances where such
inherent power has been used in other states, for the eradication of abuses both on the part of unworthy members of the
bar and by the layman against the lawyer. The methods by
which such implied power may be put in operation, are primarily within the discretion of the courts, which have a large
authority, subject, however, to the restraints which the constitution and their own voluntary respect for the acts of the
legislature, impose.
In one of the art galleries of Europe stands a statue from
the chisel of Michael Angelo: called, "The Bound Captive."
Looking at it casually, you see a captive, apparently bound
with strong ropes; the badges of his captivity. But look more
closely and you will observe that the knots of the ropes are
held in the captive's own hands, capable of being untied by
him, and impose no restraint whatever upon the captive, who
can throw them off and hurl them from him at his pleasure,
and stand forth, a free man. The courts are in much the
same condition. For years they have been deemed curbed and
76 In re Shattuck, 208 Cal. 6, 279 Pac. 998; In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676,
687, 266 Pac. 665; In re Royall, 33 N. Mex. 386; In re Buren, 102 Wash. 472,
172 Pac. 1152.
77 State ex rel. v. Circuit Court, 193 Wis. 132, 214 N. W. 396.
78 In re Richardson, 79 Cal. Dec. 477, 288 Pac. 669, 671.
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cabined by legislatures and by their own reluctance to act.
These have been fetters, to be sure, but fetters with no binding force. If the courts have a will to act, they may find that
they have resident within them a potency, which, with the
hearty cooperation of the bar, is able to purge the profession
of its dishonest elements and restore it in public estimation
to the high position in the commonwealth which it deserves
and which by right belongs to it.
It is said that there is enough latent atomic energy in a
single glass of water, if released, to generate 200 horse power
for a whole year. There is enough inherent power in a mass
of earth the size of my fist to lift the German navy from
the bottom of the ocean and place it on the highest hill in
England. There is enough power in the material of a copper
penny, to drive the Leviathan from New York to Liverpool.
So it may be said there is enough latent judicial energy in the
courts of this state to generate a power which will purge and
dignify the legal profession not for one year only, but for all
time; enough unused potency which, if released, can drive the
profession forward from a defensive attitude to one pf aggressive and positive action for the public good; enough "inherent
judicial power," to raise that profession from the place of
public criticism to which it has been consigned, to that high
and honorable position in public esteem which is its natural
and historic birthright.

